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Jurisdiction
This matter involves an appeal from a district court divorce case.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(h).

Issues Presented for Review
1. Did the district court err in awarding Respondent a future interest in a
defined benefit retirement when the parties had agreed, and the court had
accepted, the parties' agreement to credit the value of such an account against
the property division of the marital estate? The issue was addressed at trial on
April 23, 2004, (Apr. 23, 2004 Tr. at 19-20), and in subsequent hearings on
December 9, 2004 (Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at 53-56) and October 31, 2005, (October
31, 2005 Tr. at 23-47.) A trial court's property distribution in a divorce decree is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1078
(Utah 1988).
2. Did the district court err in making a supplemental divorce decree
retroactive to the date of the trial where there was no basis for entry of the order
nunc pro tunc? The issue was never discussed at any hearing. Instead, the
retroactivity language was included in the supplemental divorce decree and
Respondent did not have an opportunity to raise it with the trial court. This issue
presents a question of law, which is reviewed under a correction of error
standard. See, Maxwell v. Maxwell. 796 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Controlling Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-1.
(Exhibit A, Text of Controlling Statutes)

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal challenging the division of assets from the final order of
the district court in a divorce proceeding.

Course of Proceedings1
On August 26,1999, Petitioner filed a verified petition for divorce.
Following protracted discovery, changes in attorneys, and multiple Orders to
Show Cause, the matter came for trial before the district court for a four day
bench trial from April 20-23, 2004. The judge made oral findings following trial on
April 23, 2004. Subsequently, an Order to Show Cause, further discovery, and
numerous objections were filed to the language of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law prepared by Petitioner's counsel. The district court's Decree
of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Supplemental Decree
of Divorce were finally entered on August 28, 2006. (Exhibit B, Decree of
Divorce; Exhibit C, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Exhibit D,
1

Utah R. App. P. 24 requires references to the record to include citations thereto.
Respondent's counsel checked out the district court record to assist in briefing this matter.
However, the record at this time is not paginated in accordance with Utah R. App. P. 11(b).
Accordingly, citation to the record by page number is not currently possible.

Supplemental Decree of Divorce.) Respondent timely appealed therefrom.
(Exhibit E, Notice of Appeal.)

Statement of Facts
The facts pertinent to this appeal center around the parties' respective
retirement benefits. The Court prefaced its findings with regards to the
retirement accounts that there would be a review of a "T-Mobile account," and
that if the account was found to exist and have value, there would be a credit
given. (April 23, 2004 Tr. at 20:4-7.) This was reflected in 1J36 of the Decree of
Divorce: "If the Petitioner has additional retirement with Delta Airlines, T-Mobile,
the Respondent may be entitled to a credit for his one-half (1/2) interest."
(Exhibit B, Decree of Divorce, 1f36.)(Emphasis added.)
From the evidence introduced at trial, the trial court found that Petitioner
had interests in four retirement accounts worth $29,617.26, plus anything that
came from Respondent's further investigation. (April 23, 2004 Tr. at 20:8-13.)
The trial court found that Respondent had interests in three retirement accounts,
including a small defined benefit plan, worth $65,141.00. (April 23, 2004 Tr. at
20:21-25 - 21:1-5.) The Court took the difference between the two, splitting it in
half, and then awarded the Petitioner $17,762.00. (April 23, 2004 Tr. at 21:6-15.)
The Court specifically found that the retirement accounts should not be divided in
accordance with Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). (April 23,
2004 Tr. at 19:20-23.) The Petitioner's award of the net value of the parties'

retirement was included in a global property division, for which Respondent was
required to pay Petitioner's share of $106,704.00 by refinancing real properties to
allow for cash payment. (Decree of Divorce at ffl[37-38.)
A subsequent Order to Show Cause was scheduled to secure, among
other things, Petitioner's cooperation in refinancing properties for the settlement,
and information from Petitioner regarding her Delta Family Care Retirement Plan.
(Exhibit C, Order to Show Cause.) This Order to Show Cause issued before the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Divorce Decree had been signed.
At the hearing regarding the Order to Show Cause, Respondent raised the issue
of the offset for the Delta retirement with the Court. (Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at 53:18.)
Respondent's counsel explained to the Court that subpoenas had been sent out
and that they were having trouble finding the information. (Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at
54:3-13.) Petitioner's counsel represented that he believed that the plan in
question had been rolled over into another retirement plan and that Petitioner did
not know of any other retirement account.2 (Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at 54:20-25 - 55:1.)
The dialogue then proceeded:
Mr. Bailey (Petitioner's counsel): Now, on the record it says if a retirement
with T-Mobile, there is an offset. If there's another account, and it isn't the
same account that was rolled over, we're happy to give credit.
The Court: As an offset?
Mr. Bailey: Yeah. If there's another account that's not the same account
that was rolled over. They want to count it twice.

2

Petitioner also denied at trial and in responses to written discovery prior to trial that the
retirement plan existed.

Mr. Echard (Respondent's counsel): We've issued a subpoena and
hopefully we'll know. If we don't, you can't tie this up. I'm issuing the
subpoena and we hope to know in that time The Court: Well, I guess if the time has passed, then you end up getting a
judgment for the amount of the one-half.
Mr. Bailey: Well, we can address that. We're not here to hide anything.
We're here to be straight up, as Mr. Echard is, on this. We would
represent affirmatively to the Court there is no other retirement.
Mr. Echard: That's already (inaudible). And we're just following up on the
subpoena and we're getting a hard time from the company. But we're
doing the best we can.
(Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. at 55:2-24.)(ltalics added.)
After some effort on the part of Respondent and his counsel, Respondent
obtained evidence that there was, in fact, another retirement account in March
2005. It was shown that Petitioner had a 100% vested interest in the Delta
Family Care Retirement Plan, ("the retirement plan,") which is a defined benefit
pension plan, through which Petitioner is entitled to monthly payments of
$727.29, beginning on October. 1, 2019. Respondent retained an actuary who
determined the present value of Petitioner's interest in the plan to be
$101,326.00. Respondent filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on July 15,
2005 to bring this evidence before the Court and obtain a ruling regarding
Respondent's offset to the property division. (Exhibit F, Respondent's Motion
and Memorandum.)
On October 31, 2005, the matter came before the trial court for a hearing
on objections to the language of proposed findings and for Respondent's request
for an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner's counsel presented some details of the
plan to the Court, and argued Respondent should not receive an offset for the

plan, as previously stipulated, but should only be awarded his Woodward share.
(Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 23:22 - 27:9) Respondent proffered the expert's opinion as
to the present value of the plan. (Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 31:8-25 - 32:1-4.) The
trial court expressed concerns that the newly discovered benefit plan differed
from the previous retirement accounts, because it was difficult, according to the
court, to determine the present value of the account. (Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 34:9 36:6.) Respondent argued that he should be allowed to present evidence to the
Court. (Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 37:1-13.) The trial court concluded that an
evidentiary hearing would make no difference and awarded Respondent an
interest in the plan under the Woodward formula. (Oct. 31, 2005 Tr. at 47:6-12.)
This holding was in direct contradiction to 1J36 of the Decree of Divorce. This
order was reduced to writing in the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, awarding
Respondent aninterest in. the retirement plan through April 20, 2004, the date of
the trial, as opposed to the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce. (Exhibit D,
Supplemental Decree of Divorce.) Prior to Petitioner's preparation of the
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, there was no mention of making Petitioner's
interest in the retirement plan retroactive to the date of trial by the trial court. The
trial court's in court ruling made no mention of retroactivity. (Oct, 31, 2005 Tr. at
47.) The Court gave no other notice and made no finding of good cause to
support the retroactivity of this provision. Nevertheless, the Supplemental
Divorce Decree made the award retroactive to April 20, 2004.

Summary of Argument
The Supplemental Divorce Decree entered by the trial court, which
awarded Respondent only his Woodward share of the retirement plan should be
overturned. The trial court abused its discretion in treating the retirement plan
differently from the other retirement benefits owned by the parties and in refusing
to give effect to a stipulation between the parties, which the Court had previously
adopted and concluded to be reasonable. Moreover, the trial court erred in not
holding that Petitioner was judicially estopped from changing her position.
Finally, the trial court erred in making Respondent's Woodward interest in the
retirement plan retroactive to the time of trial. The trial court's orders in these
regards should be reversed.

Argument
I.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding Respondent Only a
Woodward Interest in the Retirement Plan.
A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Awarding
Respondent an Off-Set Against the Property Division.

By awarding Respondent only a Woodward share in Petitioner's retirement
plan, the trial court abused its discretion. As a general rule, "The interest in a
retirement plan accrued during marriage is considered a marital asset subject to
equitable distribution upon divorce." Motes v Motes. 786 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). Likewise, "The best method for distributing or allocating retirement
benefits or their value depends on the particular circumstances, but where

possible the purpose to advance is that of 'end[ing] marriage and allowing] the
parties to make as much of a clean break from each other as is reasonably
possible.'" id., citing. Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988).
The court's order should allow the parties to "readjust their lives to their new
circumstances as well as possible." Gardner, at 1078. In this case, the trial court
initially did exactly that by requiring a valuation of all assets and globally dividing
all assets.
Woodward is the seminal case for determining how to distribute retirement
benefits. In Woodward, the Utah Supreme Court quoted the following language
with approval:
Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests are obviously too
susceptible to continued strife and hostility, circumstances which our
courts traditionally strive to avoid to the greatest extent possible. This goal
may be best accomplished, if a present value of the pension plan is
ascertainable, by fixing the other spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all
appropriate considerations, including the length of time the petitioner must
survive to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of other assets leaving all
pension benefits to the employee himself.
Woodward, at 433, citing. Kikkert v. Kikkert. 427 A.2d 76, 78 (N.J. Super. 1981).
The Woodward court only supported a deferred distribution "where other
assets for equitable distribution are inadequate or lacking altogether, or where no
present value can be established." Woodward, at 433. This Court has further
clarified, "Thus, as between decreeing a more immediate adjustment or simply
deferring the other spouse's participation until payments are eventually received,
our Supreme Court has stated that the latter 'alternative should be employed only

in rare instances.'" Motes, at 234, citing. Gardner, at 1079. In addition, while the
timing of benefits must depend on the circumstances of the given case, the trial
court should consider whether there is "particular animosity" between the parties
as well as whether an immediate distribution "would create a hardship or
penalty." Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Moreover,
the trial court's findings should be sufficiently detailed to allow the appellate court
to see the basis for its conclusions. See. Gardner, at 1078.
In this case, the Decree of Divorce represented the culmination of a seven
year legal battle involving numerous attorneys and numerous objections to and
hearings regarding the proposed findings.3 At the termination of trial, the Court
awarded Petitioner a cash award representing the difference in value of the
various retirement interests known to the parties at the time of trial. The trial
court specifically found that a Woodward distribution should not be employed.
This was added to a global property division, totaling in excess of $100,000.00,
which Respondent was required to satisfy by refinancing real property awarded
to him during the settlement. Based on the Petitioner's stipulation, both at trial
and at a subsequent Order to Show Cause hearing, the retirement plan was to
be treated as an off-set against the property settlement.
However, when the evidence came forward that Petitioner's prior
affirmative representations to the trial court were false, the trial court reversed
3

A review of the record reflects that Petitioner has been represented by no less than four
attorneys and that Respondent has engaged the services of at least three separate attorneys for
his cause.

course and allowed Petitioner to escape both her prior stipulation and
representations to the court. At the October 31, 2005, Petitioner argued that
there were too many variables (without enumerating any and without the proffer
of any expert opinion) to determine a present value for the retirement plan.
However, notwithstanding Respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court, without any evidence on the record before it, and in spite of proffered
evidence from an actuary to the contrary, determined that it could not be
persuaded that there was an ascertainable present value for the Petitioner's
newly discovered retirement plan.
In so doing, the trial court made no written or oral findings about the
feasibility of determining a value for the plan.4 The trial court made no findings
regarding the feasibility of Petitioner paying the plan value immediately, nor the
hardship or penalty imposed upon Respondent, who was required to satisfy his
property obligations by refinancing property to do so. The trial court likewise
failed to take into account the policy expectations promoted by this court and the
Utah Supreme Court, which advocate a property distribution that brings finality.
To the contrary, had the trial court properly applied the caselaw, it would
have noted the long, adversarial process the parties had gone through to
conclude their divorce. The trial court also should have taken into account that
the Respondent had been required to come up with cash to compensate
4

In Gardner, the court noted that "[rjegardless of how remote the full value of an asset is, it still
has present value." Gardner, at 1078. Gardner requires precise findings before a conclusion by
a trial court that present value cannot be ascertained. ]d.

Petitioner for the property distribution. Classifying Petitioner's assets differently
constituted an unfair penalty. In addition, deferring the compensation was
patently unfair given the cash Petitioner had from the property settlement, as well
real property Petitioner retained. Given that Respondent had already paid
$100,000.00 to Petitioner in conjunction with the trial court's orders, there is no
question that Petitioner is fully able to compensate Respondent for his interest in
the retirement plan, without there being a need to defer the distribution until
Petitioner's retirement. Finally, the trial court's order leaves uncertainty for
Respondent, who now must wait several years before his rights are resolved,
where the same is not true for the Petitioner. The trial court's failure to address
or properly weigh these issues can only be considered an abuse of discretion.
This Court should accordingly reverse the trial court's findings relevant to the
retirement plan.

B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Enforce the
Stipulation of the Parties.

The trial court further abused its discretion in this matter by failing to
enforce the stipulation of the parties, entered into the record at trial, and further
confirmed at the December 9, 2004 Order to Show Cause hearing. In Batty v.
Batty, 2006 UT App 506,1J2, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 54, this Court wrote:
"[P]arties are generally free to agree upon facts subject to judicial
application of the law." While such an agreement may be perceived as
paring back the role of the court as fact-finder, ... in most cases this result
should be welcomed as an exercise entirely consistent with efficient and

just judicial administration." Thus, while "[t]he court need not necessarily
abide by the terms of the litigants'] stipulations" regarding property
distribution, those stipulations "should be respected and given great
weight."
Id., citing. In re E.H.. 2006 UT 36, fl22, 137 P.3d 809; Pearson v. Pearson. 561
P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977). See, ajso, Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah
1975)(Stipulation should be adopted if it is fair and reasonable.) In Batty, the
parties had stipulated to a valuation of business holdings. The trial court
discounted the valuation and assessed a value, which resulted in a substantial
inequality. This Court concluded that in so doing, the trial court committed an
abuse of discretion.
In this case, at the time of trial, the trial court adopted the stipulation of the
parties regarding the retirement plan as a reasonable one. The parties further
affirmed their commitment to this stipulation at the subsequent order to show
cause hearing where Petitioner's counsel stated to the court, "If there's another
account, and it isn't the same account that was rolled over, we're happy to give
credit [as an off-set.]" In the October 31, 2005 hearing the trial court deviated
from this agreement claiming that it never anticipated a difference in the type of
retirement account. However, neither the trial court nor the parties ever made
such a distinction in the stipulation. Furthermore, at least one of Respondent's
accounts, for which the trial court assigned a present value and added to
Petitioner's property distribution, was also a defined benefit retirement plan. The
trial court's abuse of discretion is most highlighted by its initial conclusion that the

stipulation should be followed. In reversing course, the trial created inequality by
treating Petitioner's assets differently. Respondent was subject to undue
hardship as he was required to refinance properties to compensate Petitioner for
benefits which were classified differently from the Petitioner's assets.
Accordingly, the trial court's treatment of the retirement plan should be reversed.

II.

Petitioner Should Be Judicially Estopped From Demanding a
Woodward Division of the Retirement Plan.
Not only did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to adopt the

stipulation of the parties in its Supplemental Divorce Decree, but it erred in
allowing Petitioner to take an inconsistent position from that taken at trial and in
the December 9, 2004 hearing. Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a person
or their privies may not deny a position taken in a prior judicial proceeding, to the
prejudice of another, it such prior position was successfully maintained. See.
e.g.. 3D Constr. and Dev.. L L C , v. Old Standard Life Insurance Co.. 2005 UT
App 307, fl11,117 P.3d 1082. In Utah, the doctrine of judicial estoppel has five
elements of proof:
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v.Qpenshaw Investment Co.. 102 Utah 509,
132 P.2d 388 (1942), the supreme court identified four elements a party
seeking to invoke the judicial estoppel doctrine must show: (1) the prior
and subsequent judicial proceedings involved the same parties or their
privies; (2) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings involve the same
subject matter; (3) the party opposing judicial estoppel seeks to deny a
position he or she took in the prior judicial proceeding; and (4) the party
seeking judicial estoppel in the subsequent judicial proceedings must have
"relied on the former testimony." More recently, this court identified a fifth
requirement for a party seeking to invoke the judicial estoppel doctrine -

the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought must have exhibited bad
faith.
Orvis v. Johnson. 2006 UT App 394, HIP4-15, 146 P.3d 886. In 3D Construction.
the Court noted that bad faith was not demonstrated by mistakenly checking a
box on a bankruptcy form, but was evidenced in false affirmative representations.
3D Construction, at fl12.
In the case at bar, the elements of judicial estoppel are met. Each of the
judicial hearings involved was centered in the parties' divorce, to which both
Petitioner and Respondent are parties. At trial, and at the December 9, 2004
order to show cause, Petitioner affirmatively stipulated that if another retirement
account existed it should be the basis for an off-set to the property division in
favor of Respondent. This was noted in the Divorce Decree and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law themselves. Moreover, Petitioner benefited from the
stipulation in that the Court awarded her a present value cash distribution for
retirement benefits, as opposed to a Woodward share. Respondent relied on
these representations in conducting further discovery to identify undisclosed
benefits and in refinancing his properties to comply with the court order
predicated in part on the stipulation. Finally, Petitioner exhibited in bad faithJn
affirmatively representing to the first that any benefit had been rolled over into
some other plan, and second by affirmatively representing to the Court that the
retirement plan did not exist.

Under these circumstances, the Petitioner should be estopped from
denying the effect of the parties' stipulation on the later discovered retirement
plan. In allowing Petitioner to reverse arguments and advocate that Respondent
only receive his Woodward share, the trial court erred. The decision of the trial
court awarding Respondent only a Woodward share of the retirement plan should
be reversed.

III.

The Trial Court Erred In Making Its Decree Retroactive to the Time of
Trial Nunc Pro Tunc.
Utah law states, "A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good

cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc Pro
Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of
marriage." Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-1. The appellate courts have broadly
interpreted this statute to allow retroactivity of divorce orders upon a showing of
good cause. See, e ^ , Home v. Home. 737 P.2d 244, 248-49 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). Likewise, the meaning of good cause "must be determined on a case by
case basis, in light of all of the surrounding circumstances, as equity and justice
require." id. Notwithstanding, the liberal application of this statute, the trial court
erred in making Respondent's Woodward share in the retirement plan retroactive
to the time of trial.
The district court's order in this regard is error because of lack of notice
and absence of good cause. The issue of ordering that the Woodward share

apply retroactively was never raised by Petitioner when discovery proved that the
retirement plan existed. A possible nunc pro tunc order was likewise never
raised when the trial court heard oral arguments on the matter on October 31,
2005. To the contrary, Petitioner's counsel simply slipped the retroactivity
language into the final version of the Supplemental Divorce Decree.
The Supplemental Divorce Decree is further wanting because there is no
finding of good cause. As the matter was never raised with the trial court, the
trial court made no findings in this regard as required by the statute. In this case,
even assuming arguendo that the retirement plan should only be divided under
Woodward, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there is not
good cause for valuing the interest retroactively to the time of trial. Prior to trial,
at trial, and at subsequent hearings, Petitioner affirmatively represented to the
Court that the retirement plan did not exist. A review of the record reflects that
Respondent had to undertake extensive efforts to prove the existence of the
retirement plan. Only in March 2005, almost a year after the trial, did Delta
Airlines officials provide answers to Respondent's subpoenas. Given the effort
required of Respondent and his counsel to prove the existence of the
undisclosed retirement plan, the equities of the matter demand that the
retirement plan be valued as of the date of the Supplemental Divorce Decree.
The determination of the trial court should be reversed in this regard.

Conclusion
As set forth herein, the district court's treatment of the retirement plan
reflected an abuse of discretion. The district court did not treat the retirement
assets of the parties equally, and provided an insufficient basis for awarding
Respondent only a Woodward share in the retirement plan. The district court
further abused its discretion in failing to adopt the express stipulation of the
parties. Moreover, the district court erred in allowing Petitioner to take an
inconsistent position as to the treatment of the retirement plan, which was at
variance with the parties' stipulation. Finally, the district court's retroactive
valuation of Respondent's Woodward share constitutes further error as the order
did not comply with the statute. For these reasons, Respondent respectfully
requests that the district court's findings relative to the retirement plan be
reversed, and that the matter be remanded for a determination as to the present
value of Respondent's interest in the retirement plan, to be off-set against the
property division.
DATED this

+*>

day of March, 2007.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

Bv: % % J V W >
Brad C. S r f f l t f f - ^
Benjamin C Rasmussen
Attorneys for Respondent
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prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, to the
following individuals:
Jon J. Bunderson
45 North 100 East
Brigham City, UT 84302

Exhibit A

rage I at 2

10-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division of debts mrt to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time — Determination of alimony —
imeritorious petition for modification.
1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children,
>erty, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
i) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
lependent children;
:>) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
opriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
:) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the
es contracted or incurred during marriage;
i) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts,
jations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
ii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
I) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
I) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
ing of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent
ren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care
le dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
heir support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts
reasonable and necessary.
) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children bom to the mother and father after entry
j decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the
idiate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.
) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer
force a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
mrt determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent
Ler member of the immediate family where a visitation or
t-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs,
ling actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to
ie or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
I (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
) the length of the marriage;
i whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
i) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for
tion received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in

stermining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and
suitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial.
i marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may
insider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the
>ouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
rtermining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of
Dth spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property anc
yarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived or
3rn during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the
Larriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based
1 a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did
Dt exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as
rovided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct
istifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
larriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that
istify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
)rmer spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the
^marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is
lade a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the part}
aying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.
onended by Chapter 129, 2005 General Session
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Exhibit B

STEVEN R. BAILEY #0174
Attorney for Petitioner
2454 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-4430
Facsimile: (801) 621-4436

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT - STATE OF UTAH

r o
> -*
> CO

oS
PAMELA A. LAMANO,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

>
z
o

Petitioner,
vs.
Case No. 994701457
BRIAN C. LAMANO,
Respondent.

Judge Glen R. Dawson

The Court having received into evidence the Affidavit of Grounds; and having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; now makes and enters the
following Order:
DECREEJQFJUYQRCE

1.

The Petitioner and the Respondent are each granted a divorce one from the
other based upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences.

2.

The parties are each awarded joint legal and physical custody of the parties'
minor child with Respondent having the primary physical residence, to wit:
Skyelee Brooke Lamano, born June 26, 1995. Vhe Court orders that the pnmaiy

residence of Skyelee at the present time will be designated as the Respondent's.
This may be reviewed in the future.
Skyelee Lamano shall continue her counseling sessions with Angela Jackson to
assist her in dealing with her parents and helping her express herself as it
pertains to non-essential activities that she wishes to participate in. Dr. Matthew
Davies is directed to send Angela Jackson a letter outlining his thoughts
regarding her involvement as a neutral facilitator in assisting Skyelee. This Court
finds that it is appropriate to incorporate both of Dr. Davies' letters in the final
order of the Court. The letters were received into evidence; and are attached to
the Findings as Exhibits "A" and "B".
Michael Glasmann shall continue as Master to make decisions regarding
visitation issues, Skyelee's activities, and assist the parties in resolving other
issues that may arise. Michael Glasmann shall have decision making capability
to address post-divorce issues based on the agreement of the parties. Either
party may object to his recommendations, but in the event in the opinion of the
Court that said objection is frivolous, the other party will be entitled to their
attorney's fees and other sanctions that may be imposed.
Michael Glasmann shall be given authority to make decisions in the event the
parties cannot agree, which would include, but not be limited to, issues involving
visitation schedules; to listen to Skyelee as to what activities she wishes to
participate in; to address conflicts between the parties as it pertains to Skyelee
regarding parenting issues, or any other issues that the parties cannot resolve
2

including education, school, etc., and to enforce violations of agreements
entered into by the parties that are not followed.
6.

Michael Glasmann shall have decision-making capabilities in this regard and
made recommendations, subject to this Court's review, in the event either party
asks for a review. In the event a hearing is requested to review Michael
Glasmann's recommendation and in the opinion of the Court said objection is
frivolous, then the party requesting a hearing will be subject to having attorney's
fees being awarded in favor of the other party for having to respond.

7.

The Court orders that, based upon the recommendations made in Court of
Dr. Matthew Davies, in the event that either party interferes with the other
parties' involvement with Skyelee or fails to comply with the agreement of this
Court or the recommendations of Michael Glasmann, the offending party will be
subject to a finding of contempt and or a jail sentence as well as other
appropriate penalties.

8.

The Court requests the Respondent to meet with Skyelee's therapist, Angela
Jackson, to determine if there are any problems with Skyelee continuing in
therapy with Angela Jackson. In the event the Respondent has concerns, he
may bring his concerns before this Court only to determine whether or not his
concerns are justified requiring that Skyelee participate with another counselor.
In the event a new counselor is necessary, the Court will rely on the
recommendations of Dr. Matthew Davies, though the Court does find, based
upon the conversation with Skyelee, in chambers, that Skyelee has a good
3

working relationship with Angela Jackson.
9.

Based upon a stipulation of the parties read in open Court and based upon joint
physical custody, the Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of
$110 per month as and for child support based upon the parties's income as
outlined in Paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact. Child support will commence
May 1,2004.

10.

Both parties currently maintain the minor children on their health insurance.
Each party will continue to maintain the children and each party will pay one-half
(!4) of any non-covered medical, dental, or orthodontic expenses for the minor
children.

11.

The Court orders and the parties have agreed to follow the standard parent-time
schedule for the purposes of determining holiday visitation. That the
Respondent will follow the Odd year schedule and the Petitioner will follow the
Even year schedule. That Halloween and Valentine Days will alternate by the
parents. In the event of conflict with vacation plans, Respondent's plans will
prevail in the even years, and the Petitioner's plans will prevail in the odd years.
The Respondent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years, and the even
year holidays in the odd years.

12.

Neither Angela Jackson nor Michael Glasmann may be removed from their
professional capacity without an order of this Court. Both parties are ordered to
pay one-half (%) of the costs associated with such therapy or costs associated
with the Master if not covered by insurance after the date of trial.
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13.

Both parties shall have equal access to Angela Jackson and shall work with her
for the benefit of Skyelee.

14.

In the event that either party interferes with the other parties' involvement with
Skyelee or fails to comply with the order of the Court or the recommendations of
Michael Glasmann, the offending party will be subject to a jail sentence and/or a
finding of contempt by this Court and appropriate penalties will be imposed.

15.

In the event that Skyelee wishes to participate in other recreational, religious or
social activities, her opinion shall be given great weight by both Angela Jackson
and Michael Glasmann in determining what activities she will participate in.

16.

The exchange of Skyelee for visitation will be curbside at the other parties'
residence. The party dropping off Skyelee may remain until the party is assured
that Skyelee is safe and with a family member or someone she is familiar with.

17.

In the event that either party is going to be less than four hours from the agreed
upon drop off time because of work commitments, then Skyelee may stay with
her grandmother, a family member or someone she is familiar with. In the event
either party is going to be more that four hours late picking up the child or being
available for drop-off, then the parent having Skyelee may keep her until the
other parent becomes available. In the event either parent will not arrive before
10:00 p.m., Skyelee will remain with that parent she is presently with, and the
other parent may pick Skyelee up after 8:00 a.m. the following day.

18.

The Court orders that if there is going to be an extended absence of four of more
hours by either party, then either party will be given preference for providing the
5

necessary daycare for watching Skyelee as is provided by statute.
19=

Skyelee's Delta flight card will be assigned to her along with her passport, and
will follow her with whatever parent she is with at the time. This, however, does
not mean that for every visitation exchange the Delta flight card and passport
need not be transferred. Skyelee has access to a Delta flight card that is
assigned to her. The card will be kept with and will follow Skyelee, and may be
used if the Respondent travels with Skyelee so long as he does not violate any
of the rules and regulations of Delta Air Lines in utilizing the Delta flight card in
the event the Respondent and Skyelee fly together.

20.

The Respondent is awarded no interest in the Petitioner's "Buddy Passes" or
"Companion Passes" provided by Delta Air Lines and the passes will not be
considered marital property.

21.

Petitioner withdraws her claim to alimony and alimony is not awarded to
Petitioner and Petitioner waives any future claim to alimony and as part of this
settlement. Petitioner may keep the two burial plots currently owned, and
Respondent waives any future claim to the buddy passes Petitioner receives
from her employment at Delta Air Lines. Respondent made no request for
alimony.

22.

In the event that the Respondent is traveling with Skyelee using Skyelee's Delta
flight pass, he will act appropriately in all circumstances in order not to jeopardize
the Petitioner's employment with Delta Air Lines. The Respondent will not be
able to upgrade Skyelee's "S3" pass to a higher priority pass.
6

23.

If either party is traveling domestically for more than three (3) days, they will give
each other at least seven (7) days advance notice and, in the event that party
and child travels out of state, they will provide an itinerary, projected schedules,
hotel and contact telephone numbers. In the event of a change, the party having
Skyelee with them will advise the other parent, as soon as possible, upon any
changes being made. In the event the parties are traveling internationally, each
party will cooperate with the other to ensure that Skyelee has her passport and
will notify the other thirty (30) days in advance of perspective flights with the
understanding that if a flight changes because of a problem, then each party will
give the other as much possible notice regarding said changes.

24.

The parties have agreed to a division of personal property with the exception of
certain items, and each party has the property they request in their possession
they wish. In open Court, the parties agreed that the couch and love seat will be
returned to the Respondent who has the responsibility for picking those items up.
The Petitioner is entitled to her dresser in the Respondent's home and her
personal property in the Respondent's storage shed.

25.

The parties will exchange and provide any photos or videos of family activities for
the purposes of copying by February 1, 2005, then each party will split the cost
associated with the copying effort.

26.

The parties, during the course of the marriage, have acquired various parcels of
property, which are identified as follows:
A)

111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah 84041
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27.

B)

1013 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

C)

997 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

D)

1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

E)

1033 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

F)

1041 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

G)

1225 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

H)

Lot 208, Peacefield Subdivision, Layton, Utah

The Court orders that, based upon the November 2, 1999 hearing, the
Respondent will be awarded the two West properties located at 997 East Gentile
Street and 1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah. The Petitioner will be
awarded the East properties located at 1033 East Gentile Street and 1041 East
Gentile Street, Layton, Utah.

28.

The Respondent is awarded the residence that he is presently living in located at
111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah and that the Petitioner is awarded the
residence that she is presently living in located at 1013 East Gentile Street,
Layton, Utah free and clear of any claim by the other party.

29.

The 1225 East Gentile property was acquired by the parties in 1994 in which a
second mortgage with Washington Mutual was taken out in the family residence
located at 111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah, and a second mortgage with
Community First on one of the west four-plexes located at 997 East Gentile
Street, Layton, Utah which is awarded to the Respondent.

30.

The Respondent will be awarded the two four-plexes located at 997 East Gentile
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Street and 1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah, free and clear of any claim by
the Petitioner. The legal description to be used will be the legal description
recorded with the Davis County Recorder's Office, subject to any easements of
record.
31.

The Respondent will be awarded Lot 208 Peacefield and 1225 East Gentile (raw
land) as his sole property free of any claim of Petitioner.

32.

The Petitioner will be awarded the two four-plexes located at 1033 East Gentile
Street and 1041 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah, free and clear of any claim by
Respondent. The legal description to be used will be the legal description
recorded with the Davis County Recorder's Office, subject to any easements of
record.

33.

The parties will continue to share the garbage dumpster, parking and common
areas and access as they have historically done and neither party shall interfere
with the historical use or enjoyment of those areas subject to any legal action
filed by either party addressing the real property issues.

34.

Each party is given the right of first refusal in the event the other party wishes to
sell their four-plexes by giving written notice of the terms of the sale to the other
party, and the other party, upon receiving written notice, shall have fifteen (15)
days to match it.

35.

In reviewing the various properties and equities of the parties, the retirements,
and having calculated the various offsets, there is a difference in which the
Petitioner will be reimbursed by the Respondent the amount of $106,704 from
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the Respondent for a total of $106,704 that the Respondent owes the Petitioner.
36.

The Court orders that, based upon the agreement of the parties, if the Petitioner
has additional retirement with Delta Air Lines, T-Mobile, the Respondent may be
entitled to a credit for his one-half (Yz) interest. The Respondent represented
that he sent a subpoena requesting the records. The Court has addressed this
item in the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the
Supplemental Decree of Divorce.

37.

Based upon the decision of the Court, the Petitioner is awarded an interest to
offset the value of real estate and retirement that was awarded to the
Respondent in the sum of $106,704.

38.

The parties are ordered to refinance their properties to remove each other's
names from any mortgage obligation and are directed to execute quit claim
deeds as may be necessary to effectuate the Court's order. In the event that the
Respondent is unable to refinance the property, then the Respondent will pay to
the Petitioner the sum as follows: $25,000 plus interest at the rate of five percent
(5%) on the 120th day after this hearing with 25,000 plus interest due each and
every year thereafter for a period of two (2) years, and on the third year, the
remaining balance in the sum of $56,704 plus interest.

39.

The Respondent will be awarded the 1991 Jeep Wrangler and the 1987 Ford
Truck subject to the indebtedness thereon and the two 1974 Yamaha
motorcycles, his personal motorcycle, and the motorcycle trailer. The Petitioner
will be awarded the 1991 Toyota Camry subject to the indebtedness thereon, if
10

any. Each party will execute any documents necessary to effectuate this
transfer.
40.

The Petitioner has accrued the following retirements with definitive cash
amounts:
Delta Family Care Savings Plan

$18,166.98

American General Financial

$3,052.16

Delta Sky Shares

$2,340.80

American Scandia

$5,607.32

TOTAL:
41.

$29,617.26

The Respondent has accrued the following retirements and definitive cash
amounts:
Thrift Savings Plan

$43,220.00

Traditional IRA

$16,390.00

Federal Employees

$5,531.00

TOTAL:
42.

$64,141.00

There is a difference of $35,524, which the Petitioner will be awarded a one-half
(1/2) interest in ($17,762).

43.

The Court enters a Restraining Order restraining either party from denigrating
the other or allowing a third party to denigrate the other party in front of the
parties' minor child, Skyelee, or harassing the other party.

44.

The primary religion of the minor child shall be Lutheran, but the Petitioner may
take the minor child to LDS activities and services when it is her parenting time.
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45.

On the Respondent's holidays, especially Christmas, he may take the minor child
to Lutheran midnight mass services, but the Petitioner is not obligated on her
Christmas Eve or other holidays to take the child to Lutheran services or allow
the Respondent to take the child to Lutheran services if it is not his parenting
time. Whichever parent Skyelee is with that day may take her to whatever
religious service they wish.

46.

On the Petitioner's holidays or parenting time, the Respondent will not be
allowed to take the child to religious or other activities. On the Respondent's
holidays or parenting time, the Petitioner will not be allowed to take the child to
religious or other activities.

47.

In the event of Bible School, the parties are directed to adjust their schedules to
accommodate Skyelee's participation in the event that Skyelee wishes to attend.
For significant religious functions or ceremonies, the parties shall work through
the Special Master and Angela Jackson.

48.

If there are conflicts between religious activities, then the Lutheran religious
activities will be given preference. The Court orders that a church hay ride,
picnics, or other activities, which the Court considers social activities, shall not
take priority over the visitation time of the Petitioner.

49.

The Petitioner will not be required to transport the child to gymnastic practices
during her parenting time. Petitioner shall pay and has paid the $1,000.00 owed
to North Davis Gymnastics.

50.

Each party will be awarded every other year the tax exemption for Skyelee, with
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the Respondent claiming her in 2004 for so long as he is current on his child
support obligation by December 31 of each year. The Petitioner shall be entitled
to Skyelee for tax purposes in the year 2005 and every odd-numbered year
thereafter.
51.

As a matter of the Petitioner's employment, Skyelee receives six (6) "S2" priority
vacation passes each year and that the passes are forfeited if not used by the
Petitioner's employment anniversary date. The Respondent is not to utilize
these passes during the periods of time that he is traveling with Skyelee, and will
not be allowed to upgrade Skyelee's "S3" pass to an "S2" vacation pass.
However, the Petitioner is encouraged to make the "S2" passes available to the
Respondent is she does not intend to use them.

52.

The Court orders that in addition to normal entry documentation for international
travel, the child is under 18 years old and must have a written notarized
statement from the other parent to travel internationally. The Court orders both
parties to cooperate in providing a written notarized statement to allow Skyelee
to travel.

53.

The Petitioner will not disrupt Skyelee's flight schedule while she is flying with the
Respondent, and will not make negative comments on Delta's Flight System
regarding the minor child or the Respondent.

54.

Each party will pay their own attorney's fees and costs associated therewith.

55.

In the event there is any violation of the Decree, or if either party files an Order to
Show Cause or Petition to Modify, that legal action will be brought before this
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Court.
56.

The Findings of Fact adopted by the Court shall further delineate the intent of
this Court and shall be incorporated as part of the order of this Court.

57.

The Petitioner shall be allowed to resume her maiden name of "Salerno" if she
so desires.
Let judgment enter accordingly.

DATED this _ J ^ d a y of

Aog

_, 2006.
BY THE COURT:
*

Glen R. D a w s o j f ^ i £ v District Court j | d g 4 W& *

Approved as to form:

rad C. Smith
Attorney for Brian Lamano
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Mailing Certificate
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of

, 2006,1 mailed a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following individual(s):
Brad C. Smith
Attorney at Law
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Exhibit C

STEVEN R. BAILEY #0174
Attorney for Petitioner
2454 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801)621-4436
Facsimile: (801) 621-4436

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT - STATE OF UTAH
PAMELA A. LAMANO,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.
Case No. 994701467

BRIAN C. LAMANO,
Respondent.

Judge Glen R. Dawson

A Trial in the above-entitled matter came regularly for hearing before the
Honorable Glen R. Dawson, sitting as Judge in the above-entitled case on the 20th day
of April 2004 at the hour of 8:30 a.m. until completed. Present in Court was the
Petitioner, Pamela A. Lamano, and her attorney of record, Steven R Barley; and the
Respondent, Brian C. Lamano, and his attorney of record, Robert A. Echard. The
Court having received and admitted into evidence the exhibits offered by counsel; and
the Court having made its decision on the record, now makes and enters the following
Findings:

F/nd, nqsoff _

J

FINDINGS
The Respondent and the Petitioner are husband and wife having been married
on September 25, 1980 in Ogden, Utah.
Both the Petitioner and Respondent are residents of Davis County, State of Utah
and have been for more than three months prior to the filing of the Complaint for
Divorce.
The Court finds that jurisdiction is vested in this Court by virtue of Utah Code
Annotated §78-27-24(6)(1953, as amended).
During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences have arisen making
the continuation of the marriage impossible. Both parties should be entitled to a
divorce one from the other on said grounds.
Three children have been born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Joshua Ryan
Lamano, born December 30, 1982; Zachary Brian Lamano, born April 8, 1984;
and Skyelee Brooke Lamano, born June 26, 1995.
Both Joshua Ryan Lamano and Zachary Brian Lamano, at the time of the trial,
were emancipated; Skyelee Brooke Lamano is a minor child.
Based upon the stipulation of the parties and order signed by this Court, Dr.
Matthew Davies was retained by the parties to determine custody for the
purposes of assessing the parties' claim to be awarded the full, complete care
and custody of the parties minor child to wit: Skyelee Brooke Lamano.
Both parties appeared on several occasions and met with Dr. Davies for the
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purposes of completing various tests, and supplied collateral references and
other documents as requested by Dr. Davies in support of their claim
9.

Dr. Davies prepared and presented letters dealing with the issue of custody
dated December 5, 2002 and December 8, 2003, respectively. This Court finds
that it is appropriate to incorporate both letters setting forth its recommendation
in the final order of the Court. The letters were received into evidence; and for
the purposes of the Findings are attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B".

10.

Based upon the stipulation entered into in open Court, the parties entered into a
temporary joint legal custody arrangement of Skyelee with both parties sharing
joint physical custody since the date of the parties' separation up through the
time of the divorce which was set forth in the order of the Court date*;! November
2, 1999.

11.

Based upon the recommendations of Dr. Matthew Davies at trial, the joint
custody of Skyelee Brooke Lamano should continue in its present form. The
Court finds, based upon Dr. Davies' conclusions, that to award one party or the
other party sole custody of the child may allow the custodial parent to use that
capacity against the non-custodial parent by interfering with the access or
visitation which the Court finds would not be in the best interest of the child. The
parties also stipulated in open Court that the joint physical custody arrangement
would continue.

12.

The Court finds that, for the purposes of setting forth the child support, the
parties have entered into an agreement in which the Respondent shall pay to the
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Petitioner, based upon a joint custody worksheet, the sum of $110 per month,
which is predicated upon the Petitioner's full time employment with Delta Airlines,
with an income imputed at $1,800 per month, and the Respondent who is
employed with N.C.U.A. at the sum of $4,235 per month commencing April 1,
2004. (A copy of the Child Support Obligation Worksheet is marked Exhibit "C"
attached hereto and be reference is incorporated into the proposed Findings and
Conclusions of Law).
13.

The Court finds that the recommendations of Dr. Davies are to be incorporated
into the parental relationship of the parties, and that the joint physical custody
continues as was stipulated by the parties in open Court.

14.

The Court finds that the parties have been using Michael Glasmann as a Master
to assist the parties in assisting them in resolving issues that arise involving
visitation, non-essential activities, and other issues involving Skyeiee.

15.

The Court finds that the Petitioner contacted Angela Jackson to act as a
counselor for Skyeiee without initially notifying the Respondent though the Court,
in chambers, met with Skyeiee and finds that Skyeiee has established a good
working relationship with Angela Jackson.

16.

The Court finds and requests that Dr. Matthew Davies write a letter to Angela
Jackson explaining her role as a neutral party ensuring that both the Petitioner
and the Respondent have necessary access to Angela Jackson and to assist her
in working for the betterment of Skyeiee in dealing with issues such as nonessential activities, visitation, parenting time, and other issues that may involve
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the Parenting recommendation as set forth by Dr. Matthew Davies.
17.

The Court finds that Michael Glasmann should continue to serve as Master is
assisting the parties and working with both parties in overcoming issues involving
non-essential activities, visitation, etc., as is relates to Skyelee and request that
Michael Glasmann work with Angela Jackson to assist Skyelee in expressing her
wishes and/or desires. Skyelee's requests are to be taken into consideration for
the best interest of Skyelee.

18.

The Court finds that Michael Glasmann should be given authority to make
decisions in the event the parties cannot agree, which would include, but not be
limited to, issues involving visitation schedules; to listen to Skyelee as to what
activities she wishes to participate in; to address conflicts between the parties as
it pertains to Skyelee regarding parenting issues, or any other issues that the
parties cannot resolve including education, school, etc., and to enforce violations
of agreements entered into by the parties that are not followed.

19.

The Court finds that Michael Glasmann should have decision-making capabilities
in this regard and made recommendations, subject to this Court's review, in the
event either party asks for a review.

20.

The Court finds that, in the event a hearing is requested to review Michael
Glasmann's recommendation and in the opinion of the Court said objection is
frivolous, then the party requesting a hearing will be subject to having attorney's
fees being awarded in favor of the other party for having to respond.

21.

The Court finds that, based upon the recommendations made in Court of Dr.
5

Matthew Davies, in the event that either party interferes with the other parties'
involvement with Skyelee or fails to comply with the agreement of this Court or
the recommendations of Michael Glasmann, the offending party will be subject to
a finding of contempt and or a jail sentence as well as other appropriate
penalties.
22.

The Court requests the Respondent to meet with Skyelee's therapist, Angela
Jackson, to determine if there are any problems with Skyelee continuing in
therapy with Angela Jackson. In the event the Respondent has concerns, he
may bring his concerns before this Court only to determine whether or not his
concerns are justified requiring that Skyelee participate with another counselor.
In the event a new counselor is necessary, the Court will rely on the
recommendations of Dr. Matthew Davies, though the Court does find, based
upon the conversation with Skyelee, in chambers, that Skyelee has a good
working relationship with Angela Jackson.

23.

The Court finds that neither party may remove Michael Glasmann, as Master, or
Skyelee's therapist, Angela Jackson, without an order of this Court. Both parties
will be ordered to pay one-half (V2) of the costs associated with such therapy or
costs associated with the Master if not covered by insurance after the date of
trial.

24.

The Court finds that, after conferring with Skyelee, in chambers, that she wishes
to participate in other recreational activities other than strictly gymnastics, and
has expressed to the Court her feelings that she would like to stop gymnastics at
6

this time. The parties shall honor Skyelee's desires as to activities and neither
party is required to participate or may force Skyelee to participate.
25.

The Court finds that both parties should work together for the benefit of Skyelee
and communicate with each other regarding activities that Skyelee participates
in. Recreational activities such as sports, dancing, tumbling, etc. will be
determined in large by the input of Skyelee either through her counselor and/or
Michael Glasmann. Great weight should be paid to Skyelee's desires as it
pertains to those type of activities.

26.

The Court finds that during the exchange of Skyelee, either party may drop
Skyelee off at curbside at the other parties' residence. Skyelee will acknowledge
that she is safe and with a family member or someone she is familiar with. In the
event that either party will not be home to receive Skyelee due to their work
schedule and their absence, and that their absence will extend for more than
four hours from the time either parent is to drop Skyelee to the other parent, that
parent shall call the other parent who may keep Skyelee until the other parent
returns home. In the event that either parent will not arrive before 10:00 p.m.,
Skyelee will remain with that parent she is presently with, and the other parent
may pick Skyelee up after 8:00 a.m. the following day.

27.

The Court finds that in the event either parent is going to be less than four hours
from the agreed drop off time, then Skyelee will stay with her grandmother, a
family member, or someone she is familiar with.

28.

The Court finds that if there is going to be an extended absence of four of more
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hours by either party, then either party will be given preference for providing the
necessary daycare for watching Skyelee as is provided by statute.
29.

The Court finds that the benefits of the Petitioner's employment are travel
benefits. The Delta flight card and travel passes, will remain with the Petitioner.
Skyelee has access to a Delta flight card that is assigned to her. The card shall
be kept with and will follow Skyelee, and may be used if the Respondent travels
with Skyelee so long as he does not violate any of the rules and regulations of
Delta Air Lines in utilizing the card in the event the Respondent and Skyelee fly
together.

30.

The Court finds that the petitioner is entitled to what is known as eight (8) "Buddy
Passes" by virtue of her employment with Delta Air Lines, and a "Companion
Pass" that the person can assign on a yearly basis to a person of her choosing.

31.

The Court finds that those flight passes are a benefit of Petitioner's employment
and shall not be considered marital property for the purposes of property
division.

32.

The Court finds that, based upon the testimony of Cory Lindquist, the Petitioner
is responsible for the actions of any person utilizing a pass card or travel benefit
conferred by Delta Air Lines on the Petitioner.

33.

The Court finds that Skyelee has a passport to travel internationally, and that the
passport will follow her. Each party will notify the other party in the event that
they intend to fly internationally thirty (30) days in advance of the projected flight
date, understanding that if flights and travel arrangements change because of a
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problem, each party will give the other party as much notice as possible to
change, i.e. itineraries, hotels, flights, etc.
34.

The Court finds that on domestic flights, the parties will give each other seven (7)
days advance notice if Skyelee is going to be out of state for more than three (3)
nights along with an itinerary of both domestic and foreign travel, of all hotel
locations, projected schedules, contact telephone numbers, and shall notify the
other party immediately if there are any variations of hotels, phone numbers, or
changes to their itineraries.

35.

The Court finds that the parties have acquired personal property during the
course of the marriage which was split by agreement of the parties in November
1999. The Court finds that, based upon the parties5 agreement (outside of the
couch and love seat which is awarded to the Respondent who will be responsible
for picking those items up) that each party has stipulated that each party may
keep the personal property, checking and savings account and motor vehicles in
their possession, free and clear of any claims by the other party. The Petitioner
shall be entitled to her dresser in the Respondent's home and her personal
property in the Respondent's storage shed. The Court finds that the parties
agreed to this in open Court.

36.

The Court funds that the parties shall take all photos and videos of family
activities to Inkley's for copying by February 1, 2005, and the parties will split the
costs associated with the copying of the pictures and home videos.

37.

The Court finds that the Petitioner should be entitled to all of her property in the
9

parties' storage shed, as agreed, including skis and other personal property.
38.

The Court finds that the property owned by Skyelee that was purchased by a
particular party with separate funds will remain with that party. However, the
parties will exchange clothes and coats as those items are for the benefit of
Skyelee and may be utilized by her.

39.

The parties, during the course of the marriage, have acquired various parcels of
property, which are identified as follows:

40.

A)

111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah 84041

B)

1013 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

C)

997 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

D)

1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

E)

1033 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

F)

1041 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

G)

1225 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah 84041

H)

Lot 208, Peacefield Subdivision, Layton, Utah

The Court further finds that the property known as 208 Peacefield Subdivision
was acquired by the Respondent after the separation of the parties and the entry
of an Order on Order to Show Cause held on or about November 2, 1999.

41.

The Court finds that, based upon the November 2, 1999 hearing, the
Respondent was awarded the two West properties located at 997 East Gentile
Street and 1005 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah. The Petitioner was awarded
the East properties located at 1033 East Gentile Street and 1041 East Gentile
10

Street, Layton, Utah. Another four-plex in the middle is owned by the
Respondent's sister, Debra Lamano.
42.

The Court finds that it has no jurisdiction over Debra Lamano as she is not a
party to this divorce proceeding. Any order entered in this case is not binding
upon Debra Lamano.

43.

The Court finds that the parties have historically shared the garbage dumpster,
parking and common areas. The Court finds that neither party shall interfere
with the historical usage or enjoyment of those areas. The historical usage of
the garbage dumpster, parking and common areas will be maintained by both
parties unless changed in any other legal action initiated by either party.

44.

The Court finds that both parties should have the option or the right of first
refusal in their event the Petitioner or the Respondent makes a decision to sell
their respective four-plex properties. In the event that either party receives a
written or verbal offer, the offer shall be reduced to writing and will be submitted
to the other party. The other party shall have fifteen (15) days to match the offer
after the terms of the sale are provided. The Court understands that the five
four-plexes located on the property along with the Petitioner's home were divided
by separate legal descriptions.

45.

The Court finds that the Respondent should be awarded the residence that he is
presently living in located at|11 East 900 South, Layton, Utah and that the
Petitioner should be awarded the residence that she is presently living in located
at 1013 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah free and clear of any claim by the other
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party, except as otherwise set forth herein.
46.

The Court finds that the 1225 East Gentile property was acquired by the parties
in 1994 in which a second mortgage with Washington Mutual was taken out in
the family residence located at 111 East 900 South, Layton, Utah, and a second
mortgage with Community First on one of the west four-plexes located at 997
East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah which is awarded to the Respondent.

47.

The Court finds that at the times of the parties' separation that the 1225 East
Gentile property was free and clear and was not encumbered with any liens or
mortgages.

48.

The Court finds that the Respondent, within 30 days of the parties' separation,
borrowed $78,000 from the First National Bank of Layton on the property, which
he used for both personal benefit and for the benefit of the children in their
wrestling activities as he testified to in Court.

49.

The Court finds that he utilized $15,000 of the proceeds to assist him in
purchasing the 208 Peacefield lot and lost $7,000 by leaving the money in the
car at the airport.

50.

The Court finds that the remaining monies may have been used for the benefit of
the parties' minor children by the Respondent, which this Court, based upon its
equitable powers, believes should be taken into consideration in determining
property awards.

51.

The Court finds that the 208 Peacefield lot was purchased after the parties'
separation, but does specifically find that $15,000 of that money was borrowed
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from a joint marital asset and that the Petitioner should have an interest of onehalf (V2) of that contribution plus interest and a percentage of the profits.
52.

The Court finds that the parties have stipulated to the value of the Peacefield
property and finds it to be valued at $136,000.

53.

The Court finds that the parties, in open Court, have stipulated to the value of the
1225 East Gentile property, known as the "raw land" with a value of $238,500.

54.

The Court finds that the parties have stipulated to the admission of the two
appraisals obtained, one by the Petitioner, and one by the Respondent, and
have agreed to add the two appraisals together and divide them in two coming
up with a value of the properties.

55.

The Court finds that the Respondent refinanced the 1225 East Gentile property
with Centennial Bank and a mortgage exists on the property of approximately
$85,135 at the date of trial.

56.

The Court finds that the parties have valued the properties as follows:

I

Parties' Real Estate
Address

Fair Market Value

|
Net Equity

Mortgage Bal.

J 997 E. Gentile

$257,000.00

$75,663.12

J1011 E. Gentile

$254,000.00

$75,740.41

[ 1033 E. Gentile

$258,000.00

$94,496.76

|

$163,350.24 |

[1041 E. Gentile

$258,000.00

$93,535.32

|

$164,464.68 |

1111 E. 900 S.

$120,750.00

$38,895.00

|

$95,855.00 |

J1013 E. Gentile

$122,500.00

$0.00 |

$122,500.00 |

11225 E. Gentile

$238,000.00

$113,650.00
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|

$181,336.88 J
$178,259.59 |

|

$124,850.00 J

$136,000.00_
1 Lot 208 Peacefield |
$80,464.00 |
J&55J536.00J
57.
The Court finds that both of the parties residences have no first mortgages
though the Respondent's residence has a second mortgage with Washington
Mutual in the sum of $35,000, but also that the Respondent increased the
mortgage by $20,047 after the separation of the parties without the knowledge or
approval of the Petitioner.
58.

The Court finds that the Respondent has testified that the monies were used to
offset the various wrestling and personal expenses of the Respondent and the
children.

59.

The Court finds that the value of the Respondent's home to be $120,750, as
agreed to by the parties, and that the value of the Petitioner's home to be
$122,500 as stipulated by the parties in open Court.

60.

The Court finds that there exists equity in the Respondent's home located at 111
East 900 South, Layton, Utah, in the sum of $85,855, and in the Petitioner's
home located at 1013 East Gentile Street, Layton, Utah, in the sum of $122,500.

61.

The Court finds that the parties have no mutual debts with the exception of the
joint mortgages owed to Bank of America on the four four-plexes.

62.

The Court finds that the Respondent has requested reimbursement for the sum
of $120,000 for his inability to utilize the "buddy passes" that the Respondent
believes that he was entitled to from 1999 up through trial. He has also
requested reimbursement for $60,000 for the lack of his ability to fly which the
Respondent has asserted he has enjoyed the benefits of from during the course
14

of the parties' marriage though he cannot show actual monetary loss.
63.

The Court finds that the Respondent has testified that he has incurred the sum of
$41,500 as and for expenses for the boys' wrestling costs, costs of travel, and
for the Respondent's costs of travel and expenses as the boys' coach. The
Court has given the Respondent credit for this sum in an equitable adjustment.

64.

The Court finds that the Respondent has asserted costs for putting the minor
child in the Olympus Gymnastics School, without the agreement of the Petitioner,
in the sum of $4,500, which he has paid.

65.

The Court finds that the Respondent has asserted other claims for
reimbursement including insurance, medical insurance, medical expenses.

66.

The Court finds, as it pertains to wrestling costs and expenses and gymnastics
costs and expenses, that even though the parties' minor children had
participated in those activities for years, the Court finds that there was no
agreement for the parties to split the costs and the Court finds that it would be
disproportional based upon the parties' income to expect the Petitioner to pay
one-half. The Respondent had a greater capacity to pay for the children's
expenses and therefore calls it even based on their ability to pay.

67.

The Court finds that the Petitioner has also incurred expenses associated with
medical, dental and wrestling costs in the sum of $18,500 even though the
Petitioner has testified that she is not seeking reimbursement, but rather that the
parties pay their own costs and expenses.

68.

The Court finds that the Petitioner has accrued the following retirements with
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definitive cash amounts:
Delta Family Care Savings Plan

$18,166.98

American General Financial

$3,052.16

Delta Sky Shares

$2,340.80

American Scandia

$5,607.32

TOTAL:
69.

$29,617.26

The Court finds that the Respondent has accrued the following retirements and
definitive cash amounts:
Thrift Savings Plan

$43,220.00

Traditional IRA

$16,390.00

Federal Employees

$5,531.00

TOTAL:
70.

$64,141.00

The Court finds that there is a difference of $35,524, which the Petitioner should
be awarded a one-half (1/4) interest in ($17,762).

71.

The Court, in reviewing the various properties and equities of the parties, the
retirements, and having calculated the various offsets finds that there is a
difference in which the Petitioner should be reimbursed by the Respondent the
amount of $106,704 from the Respondent for a total of $106,704 that the
Respondent owes the Petitioner.

72.

The Court finds that, based upon the agreement of the parties, if the Petitioner
has additional retirement with Delta Air Lines, T-Mobile, the Respondent may be
entitled to a credit for his one-half {V2) interest. The Respondent represented
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that he sent a subpoena requesting the records.
73.

The Court finds that the parties should refinance their various properties to
remove the other party from the obligation, and the parties should be required to
execute the necessary Quitclaim Deeds or other documents to effectuate the
Court's order, subject to easements of record, which shall include easements of
record. This Finding shall not be considered res judicata in the event either party
brings further action to clarify and/or address issues regarding historical usage
and recognition of easements.

74.

The Court finds that the parties will make a good faith effort within 90 days to
refinance the properties in order to remove the other parties' names and to
attempt to pay out the amount of money the Respondent owes the Petitioner in
the sum of $106,704 as a property and retirement adjustment. Both parties are
to attempt a good faith effort. In the event the parties are unable to refinance at
the same or better rate of 6.75%, the Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the
sum of $25,000 plus interest at the rate of five percent (5%) on the 120th day of
this hearing with $25,000 plus interest each and every year thereafter for a
period of two (2) years, and on the third year, the entire balance will be due and
payable.

75.

The Court finds that, based upon an agreement of the parties made in open
Court, each party will keep their own checking and savings accounts in their
possession.

76.

The Court finds that the Respondent shall be awarded the 1991 Jeep and the
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1987 Ford Truck subject to the indebtedness thereon, and that the Petitioner
shall be awarded the 1991 Toyota Camry subject to the indebtedness thereon, if
any.
77.

The Court finds that a restraining order shall be entered restraining either party
from denigrating the other, or allowing a third party to denigrate the other party in
front of the parties' minor child, Skyelee.

78.

The Court finds that, based upon Dr. Davies' recommendation, the primary
religion for the child shall be Lutheran, but this does not prevent the Petitioner
from taking the child to LDS services when it is her parenting time.

79.

The Court finds that even though certain activities involving the entire family had
been previously attended such as Christmas Eve mass, but based upon the
recommendation of Dr. Davies and the best interest of Skyelee, the Respondent
may take the child to midnight mass when it is his Christmas Eve, but the Court
will not require the Petitioner to do so on her Christmas Eve. Skyelee will be
allowed to go to church and family functions with the parent she is with for that
day.

80.

The Court finds that if there are conflicts between religious activities, then the
Lutheran religious activities will be given preference. The Court finds that a
church hay ride, picnics, or other activities, which the Court considers social
activities, shall not take priority over the visitation time of the Petitioner.

81.

The Court finds that the Bible School is an important aspect for Skyelee, and if it
is the desire of Skyelee to attend, then her preference should be accepted and
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the parties should try to accommodate her wishes by working her visitation
around that activity. For other significant religious functions or ceremonies, the
parties shall work through the Special Master and Angela Jackson.
82.

The Court finds that both parties have requested contributions for their attorney's
fees, and that the parties stipulated that they may submit affidavits of fees and
reserve and issue to determine if a need existed. However, the Court finds that
based upon the property division that each party should be required to pay their
own fees and costs incurred herein, including attorney's fees, appraisal fees and
mediation fees.

83.

The Court finds that the tax exemption for Skyelee shall alternate each year with
the Respondent claiming her in 2004 so long as he is current on his child
support.

84.

The Court finds that the Petitioner and the Respondent shall be awarded a
divorce based on irreconcilable differences arising during the marriage.

85.

The Court finds that the primary residence of Skyelee at the present time shall
be designated as the Respondent's. This may be reviewed in the future.

86.

The Court finds that the Petitioner will pay the $1,000 owed to North Davis
Gymnastics.

87.

Both parties currently maintain the minor children on their health insurance.
Each party shall continue to maintain the children and each party shall pay onehalf (1/4) of any non-covered medical, dental, or orthodontic expenses for the
minor children.
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88.

The Court finds that the parties have agreed to a settlement that the Petitioner
withdraws her claim to alimony and that alimony will not be awarded to Petitioner
and that the Petitioner will waive any future claim to alimony as part of this
settlement. Petitioner may keep the two burial plots currently owned by her, and
the Respondent waives any future claim to the buddy passes the Petitioner
receives from her employment at Delta Air Lines. The Court finds that the
parties agreed to this in open Court.

89.

As a matter of the Petitioner's employment, the Court finds that Skyelee receives
six (6) "S2" priority vacation passes each year and that the passes are forfeited if
not used by the Petitioner's employment anniversary date. The Respondent is
not to utilize these passes during the periods of time that he is traveling with
Skyelee, and will not be allowed to upgrade Skyelee's "S3" pass to an "S2"
vacation pass. However, the Petitioner is encouraged to make the "S2" passes
available to the Respondent is she does not intend to use them.

90.

The Court finds that in addition to normal entry documentation for international
travel, the child is under 18 years old and must have a written notarized
statement from the other parent to travel internationally. The Court orders both
parties to cooperate in providing a written notarized statement to allow Skyelee
to travel.

91.

The Petitioner will not disrupt Skyelee's flight schedule while she is flying with the
Respondent, and shall not make negative comments on Delta's Flight System
regarding the minor child or the Respondent.
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The Court finds that the parties have agreed to follow the standard parent-time
schedule for the purposes of determining holiday visitation. That the
Respondent will follow the Odd year schedule and the Petitioner will follow the
Even year schedule. That Halloween and Valentine Days will alternate by the
parents. In the event of conflict with vacation plans, Respondent's plans will
prevail in the even years, and the Petitioner's plans will prevail in the odd years.
The Respondent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years, and the even
year holidays in the odd years.
The court finds that the Respondent should be awarded Lot 208 Peacefield and
1225 East Gentile (raw land) as his sole property.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters its Conclusions of

CONCLUSIONS
The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from each other, which
divorce should become final and absolute upon signing by the Judge and filing
with the Davis County Clerk's Office.
The terms, provisions, and conditions contained in the parties' Findings of Fact
should be included as part of the Court's Decree of Divorce.
Let judgment enter accordingly.
DATED this ^ ' g H day of

Qu>^
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, 2006.

. r^vjxsb.
UC
G[en R. Dawson
District Court Judge
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Approved as to form:
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Mailing Certificate
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of

, 2006, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following individual(s):

Brad C. Smith
Attorney at Law
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Exhibit E

STEVEN R.BAILEY #0174
Attorney for Petitioner
2454 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801)621-4430
Facsimile: (801)621-4436
E-mail: baileylaw@awest.net
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

PAMELA A. LAMANO,

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.
[

Civil No.: 994701467

;

Judge Glen R. Dawson

BRIAN C. LAMANO,
Respondent.

The Court having entered its Supplemental Findings, now makes and
enters the following Supplemental Order:
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent be awarded his Woodward
share of the Petitioner's defined benefit pension plan known as the Delta FamilyCare Retirement Plan through Delta Air Lines, Inc. through April 20, 2004, the
date of the trial, consistent with the other retirement divisions made by this Court;

"

"

*

LAMANO,8RWNC

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondent will pay all costs incurred for
use of any tickets for Skyelee, both national or international, when Skyelee
travels with the Respondent;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that both parties will cooperate in obtaining the
paper tickets for international travel;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party will pay their own attorney's fees.
Let Judgment enter accordingly.
DATED this

^

day of

^03

2006.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable 0er\ yBUTHyn . , ,
District Courl J u j r f l g « S S u \ <i \

NOTICE TO RESPONDENT ABOVE-NAMED:

V-^kO^T-'f

/,

Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial AdminisTtariioB^you are
hereby notified that the undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of
eight (8) days from the date this notice is mailed to you to allow you sufficient
time to file any written objections to the Supplemental Decree of Divorce of the
foregoing with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections
to the form are filed within that time, the original hereof will be submitted to the
Court for signature and filing.

DATED this

tf* day of August 2006.
EVEN
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

hereby certify that on the
day of August 2006,1 mailed, via the
United States post office, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE, to the following:

Brad C. Smith
Attorney at Law
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84403

Sharon A. Newman, Legal Assistant

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE
Lamano vs. Lomono
Civil No. 994701467
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Brad C. Smith, Utah State Bar No. 6656
Stevenson & Smith, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Attorney for Respondent
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
1
j

BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT - STATE OF UTAH
PAMELA A. LAMANO,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Petitioner,
3 g T o

m

-

°5

Case No: 994701467

vs.

2;
<» ™
2?

Judge Glen R. Dawson

BRIAN C. LAMANO,
<

z

UJ

O

->
o o ""'
CO O I
£K
OO

O

^

Respondent.

O

Notice is hereby given that Brian C. Lamano, Respondent in the above-entitled
action hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the judgment entered in favor of
Petitioner in this matter on the 28th day of August, 2006.
DATED this \°i

day of September. 2006.

4"UyvZ^
Jrad C. Smith
Attorney for Respondent

994701467

VD19224861
LAMANO.BFUAN C

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing pleading by U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, this /*f day of September, 2006, to the following:
Steven R Bailey
Attorney at Law
2454 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Tel: (801) 394-4573
Fax: (801) 399-9954
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT
PAMELA A. LAMANO,

MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
CONCERNING PETITIONER'S
RETIREMENT PLAN

Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 994701467
BRIAN C. LAMANO,
Respondent.
Judge Glen R. Dawson
COMES NOW Respondent, by and through his undersigned attorney, and
moves this Court to schedule an ediventiary hearing to address off-sets for Petitioner's
Delta Family-Care Retirement Plan. More specifically, Respondent requests an off-set
to the property settlement for Petitioner's undisclosed retirement benefits. A
memorandum of points and authorities in support of this motion is filed concurrently
herewith.
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DATED this

/S

day of July, 2005.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

Brad C. Smith
Benjamin C Rasmussen

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this \v
day of July, 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, to the following
individual:
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Steven R. Bailey
2454 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Tel: (801) 394-4573
Fax: (801) 399-9954
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT
PAMELA A. LAMANO,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR HEARING CONCERNING
PETITIONER'S RETIREMENT PLAN

Petitioner,
vo,

Civil No. 994701467
BRIAN C. LAMANO,
Respondent.

Judge Glen R. Dawson

This matter came before the Court in the parties1 December 2004 hearing.
Respondent represented to the Court that he was trying to gain information regarding
Petitioner's Delta Family Care Retirement Plan, an account which Petitioner
represented to the Court as non-existent.
On 17 March 2005, Respondent's former counsel received the attached letter,
which establishes that Petitioner does in fact have an account with the Delta Family
Care Retirement Plan, which is fully vested. (Exhibit A.) In the prior hearing, the
parties stipulated that Petitioner's interest in this account would be an offset against the
property settlement. (Exhibit B, Hearing Transcript, pp. 53-56.)
Memorandum of Dointe and aiith^r.-«:A» •
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VD18558149

su

^ ,
PPort of n

Respondent has retained an actuary who has estimated the present value of the
Delta Family Care Retirement Plan as $100,326.00. (Exhibit C, Actuarial opinion.) The
present value of this plan is an offset as previously stipulated by the parties.
Respondent has searched his records to identify any other previously undisclosed
retirement benefits to which he may be entitled and has found none. (Exhibit D,
Affidavit of Brian Lamano.) Accordingly, Respondent is entitled to an offset of
$50,163.00, 50% of the present value of Petitioner's Delta Family Care Retirement plan.
Respondent has already paid over to Petitioner the sum of $101,818.85. Respondent
was obligated to pay Petitioner the sum of $106,704.00. Accordingly, Respondent is
entitled to an order directing Petitioner to return the sum of $45, 277.85. Respondent
further requests a hearing to address the issue.
DATED this

/5

day of July, 2005.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

By:

/n**^/JlvU2£-

Brad C. Smith
Benjamin C Rasmussen

2

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this r
day of July, 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities to the
following individual:
Steven R. Bailey
2454 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401

Exhibit A

Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Employee Service Center
Department 951
Post Office Box 20706
Atlanta, Georgia 30320-6001

March 17,2005
Mr. Robert A. Echard
Attorney for Respondent
2491 Washington Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden,UT 84401
RE: Pamela A. Lamano, EMP# 088346400
Dear Mr. Echard:
Pursuant to a subpoena concerning participation in the Delta Family-Care Retirement Plan, the
following is provided.
Pamela A. Lamano has met the 100% vesting requirement (completion of 5 years of credited service)
under the Delta Family-Care Retirement Plan (a defined benefit pension plan). For purposes of this
benefit calculation, benefit accruals include total participation in the Planfromthe Delta seniority date
of August 5,1987 through February 28,2005. It is assumed that Single-Life annuity payments are to
be made for the Participant's lifetime only. The monthly benefit payable at 65 on October 1,2019 is in
the amount of $727.29.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. does not compute the "present value" or the "marital portion" of a retirement
benefit from the Plan. The Plan is a defined benefit plan which is entirely employer funded, and
neither requires nor allows employee contributions. Any present value or marital portion would have
to be determined through an outside source, such as a pension actuary.
Enclosed is a copy of the Summary Plan Description, Administrative Procedures for Processing
Domestic Relations Orders and our model order. If you have any questions, please contact the
Employee Service Center at 800-693-3582.
Cordially,

Chris Coffins
Chris Collins
Manager
Employee Service Center
enclosures
X:lm
c:

Pamela A. Lamano

Exhibit B

CERTIFIED COPY

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT
PAMELA A. LAMANO,
Petitioner,
Civil No. 9,94701467
-vs-

Judge Glenn R. Dawson

BRIAN C. LAMANO,
Respondent.

December 9, 2004
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING

GARCIAfcfLOVE
COURT REPORTING AND VlDEOGflRPHV
36 South Stole Street • Suite 1 2 2 0 • Solt Loke City, UT 8 4 1 1 1 • 801 538 2 3 3 3 • Fox

538 2 3 3 4

1

MR. ECHARD:

2

THE COURT:

3

(Inaudible.)
He's going to draft this one.

Mr. Echard is drafting this one.

4

MR. BAILEY:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. ECHARD:

He (inaudible) short memory.
It's basically-I'm just going to say you found

7

that neither party is in contempt, the legitimate--do

8

what you said here.

9

we entered into an agreement that both parties would

And then in addition to that, that

10

execute Quit-Claim Deeds in the current legal

11

descriptions.

12

Mr. Bailey will hold the others and release them as

13

necessary in the refinancing of the two properties for

14

the $106,000.

We'll give those to him now and

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. ECHARD:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. LAMANO:

Now, there's one more thing.

19

MR. ECHARD:

What's that.

20

MR. LAMANO:

The Delta family care retirement--

21

MR. ECHARD:

No, no, no.

22

Within 90 days?
Within 90 days.
Or the judgment at the amounts--

We're dealing with

that later.
MR. LAMANO:

23

No.

It was an offset to the

24

$106,000.

And if it--we haven't received information.

25

We're trying to get a subpoena on the Delta family care
53

retirement.

The Court ordered an offset if there was

any monies in retirement.
MR. ECHARD:
Your Honor.

Let me tell you about the status,

We issued a subpoena, because they

represented there wasn't any and indicated we could
subpoena.

We issued a subpoena.

They said they were

transferring it, somebody else was managing it. They
didn't know if there was money there or not.
The company we issued a subpoena to, they
didn't answer.

I'm issuing another subpoena.

know if there will be any or will not be any.

We don,'t
I know

that you don't agree, Brian, but I don't think that can
hold up this transaction.
THE COURT:
cause, was it?

That wasn't in your order to show

I don't remember that.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
MR. BAILEY:

Yeah.

It was mentioned.

What it is,

Your Honor, is-THE COURT:
MR. BAILEY:
sharing plan.

Okay.

I'm sorry.

--(inaudible) family profit

That was rolled over by (inaudible) at

the end of 2003, just shortly before the first trial was
continued, to Fidelity, managed by (inaudible).
(Parties talking at the same time, inaudible.)
MR. BAILEY:

It is the same plan.

That's our
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1

position.

2

We don't know of any other retirement.
Mow, on the record it says if a retirement with

3

T-Mobile, there is an offset.

4

account, and it isn't the same account that was rolled

5

over, we're happy to give credit.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BAILEY:

If there's another

As an offset?
Yeah.

If there's another account

8

that's not the same account that was rolled over.

9

want to count it twice.

10

MR. ECHARD:

11

hopefully we'll know.

12

up.

13

that time--

14

We've issued a subpoena and
If we don't, you can't tie this

I'm issuing the subpoena and we hope to know in

THE COURT:

Well, I guess if the time has

15

passed, then you end up getting a judgment for the

16

amount of the one-half.

17

They

MR. BAILEY:

Well, we can address that. We're

18

not here to hide anything.

19

up, as Mr. Echard is, on this.

20

affirmatively to the Court there is no other retirement.

21

MR. ECHARD:

We're here to be straight
We would represent

That's already (inaudible).

22

we're just following up on the subpoena and we're

23

getting a hard time from the company.

24

the best we can.

25

THE COURT:

And

But we're doing

Let me--we've already delayed this
55

1

seven, eight months, and I just hate to--

2

MR. ECHARD:

3

THE COURT:

I agree.
I mean, if you get something within

4

the 45- to 90-day period that we're contemplating here,

5

then we can readdress it.

6

have to be addressed in some sort of judgment.

7

MR. ECHARD:

Otherwise, it would probably

And we can get it done.

8

Mr. Bailey and I already know what the Court's order is

9

and we can solve it.

10
11
12

THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you need any further

direction on today's order?
MR. ECHARD:

I don't think so, except if I

13

understand correctly, once we work through the findings

14

and decree if we have two or three things that--which we

15

are in dispute, we can have a phone conference with Your

16

Honor and--

17
18
19
20

THE COURT:

You bet.

You bet.

And the parties

to bear their own attorney's fees.
MR. BAILEY:

And the interest would start in 90

days or start now?

21

THE COURT:

22

had ordered before.

23

heard today, I think it's best that we just take a fresh

24

start as of today.

25

MR. ECHARD:

In 90 days.

That's--that's what we

And based on the testimony I've

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor.
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Exhibit C

Morgan Actuarial Services, Inc.
2225 ES/KmayHo^Rd.,#lG6
Salt Lake Cfy, UT 84107

ptmemm.70%
Fax801.273.6744
nwfacJ@xmsskm.com

April 22,2005

Brian Lamano
111 East900South
Layton,UT 84041
Dear Mr. Lamano,
As you requested, we have calculated the present value of retirement benefits earned by your wife
from the Delta Family Care - Retirement Plan. In determining the present value of benefits, we
relied without audit on the information that you provided for benefit amounts and participant data.
The benefit provided by the plan administrators was $727.29 per month payable for the life of
Pamela Lamano beginning at age 65. The present value of this monthly payment as of May 1,
2005 is $53,096. The present value was calculated using an interest rate of 4.78% and postretirement mortality based on the 1994 Group Annuity Reserving Table blended and projected as
defined by Revenue Ruling 2001-62. The interest and mortality used are based on fee statutory
requirements for calculating minimum lump sums as defined in IRC section 417(e).
The ultimate benefit payable from a defined benefit plan of this nature is heavily dependent upon
the participant's earnings in the years immediately preceding retirement The plan administrator
does not appear to have taken into consideration future salary increases when calculating the
monthly benefit Taking future salary increases into consideration we have estimated the value of
the benefit, with service through February 28,2005, to be $100,326i
The plan administrator did not provide calculation details or participant data with the benefit
amount For purposes of estimating the impact of future salary increases we estimated the current
average salary to be $35,500 and the Social Security benefit payable at age 65 to be $14,429. The
current average salary is projected to age 65 using a 4% salary scale.
Please contact us if you have any questions or if you need any additional information.
Sincerely,

Patrick I Mele, MAAA, EA
Consulting Actuary

Exhibit D

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Tel: (801) 394-4573
Fax: (801) 399-9954
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT
PAMELA A. LAMANO,

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN LAMANO

Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 994701467

BRIAN C. LAMANO,
Respondent.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER

Judge Glen R. Dawson

)
ss.
)

COMES NOW Affiant, Brian C. Lamano, having been duly sworn, and on his
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

My name is Brian C. Lamano. I am the Respondent in the above-entitled action.
I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein.

2.

In conjunction with this case, I have fully searched my records and disclosed all
of my assets throughout the course of discovery.

3.

To my knowledge, I have no interest in any property, other than that previously

1

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORA!
ATTORNEYS A T LAW
3986 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN, UTAH 84403
TELEPHONE (801) 394-4573

OR (801) 399-9910
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